Blog posts

The article provides a detailed breakdown of a DLL hijacking vulnerability in Check Point SmartConsole, explaining how malicious DLLs could be loaded to achieve remote code execution before the issue was patched.

macOS kernel vulnerability where a race condition between the display reset process and frame buffer updates, causing Stack Based Buffer Overflow which leads to kernel panic (potential privilege escalation) on Apple M1 systems.

Microsoft Visual Studio Code on macOS has a misconfiguration in its Electron setup that enables the “RunAsNode” fuse, letting attackers bypass Apple’s TCC privacy protections and inherit sensitive permissions. It’s a proven flaw that works post-compromise, but Microsoft has refused to patch it, claiming it requires local access and doesn’t meet their servicing bar. The result is that any malware on the system could silently leverage VS Code to access private data without additional prompts.

Desktop application security lacked unified standards—until now. DASVS provides a structured approach to securing Windows, macOS, and Linux applications with clear verification levels and technical security controls. Our roadmap includes the Desktop Application Security Testing Guide (DASTG) and an automated security assessment tool. Join the community and help shape the future of desktop security!

The article discusses vulnerabilities in the Sparkle framework on macOS, related to improper XPC client validation. This leads to two main threats: a TCC Bypass (CVE-2025-10015) and Local Privilege Escalation (LPE) (CVE-2025-10016). Malicious applications can exploit these vulnerabilities to access TCC-protected files and escalate privileges. A proof of concept shows how an attacker can read sensitive files on the Desktop without triggering permission requests, highlighting the risks associated with services in applications like Ghostty.

macOS stored complete download URLs – including authentication tokens and API keys – in persistent file metadata through the kMDItemWhereFroms extended attribute, exposing sensitive credentials to local attackers and malicious applications for lateral movement. Apple silently patched the vulnerability around macOS Tahoe without CVE assignment, public acknowledgment, or researcher credit, violating responsible disclosure norms two years after the initial report.

This post shows how an apparent format string vulnerability in Apple’s TCC daemon isn’t actually exploitable due to assembly-level stack manipulation that inadvertently provides the missing arguments. It demonstrates how bugs aren’t always what they seem, as low-level calling conventions, compiler optimizations, or decompiler artifacts can mask or fix high-level code issues.